Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights

In the annual reports on Ukraine’s progress toward EU membership, the “Fundamental Rights” section emphasizes the role and capacity of the National Human Rights Institution (NHRI), specifically the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights.

Despite acknowledging the Commissioner as an active and generally effective institution, the European Commission emphasizes ongoing systemic challenges, including insufficient resource support, limited financial and operational independence, and the need for improved legal regulation. In this context, the Commission highlights that the effectiveness and independence of national human rights institutions should be evaluated against international and European standards, particularly the Paris and Venice Principles and relevant EU case law. They define the NHRI’s capacity to monitor and evaluate compliance with human rights, offer recommendations to authorities, prepare public reports, engage with civil society and international institutions, guarantee physical, legal, and informational accessibility of its activities, and, if mandated, effectively address individual complaints and take preventive measures. The European Commission considers that the mandate and practical work of the Commissioner must fully align with these standards. This alignment is seen as essential for truly protecting human rights and is a crucial part of Ukraine’s European integration process.

Text as of March 2026

Based on research and human rights practice, we can identify the following issues related to NHRI in Ukraine:

The current legislation does not sufficiently align with international standards, especially the Paris and Venice principles. This discrepancy necessitates amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights” and related regulatory acts. In our opinion, Draft Law No. 13181, developed by the Commission, does not meet its stated objectives. Specifically, it fails to provide guarantees for the institution’s independence, does not specify transparency and accountability measures, and does not enhance the institution’s overall efficiency. It also fails to take into account that the Commissioner, with the current powers, cannot perform the functions of an independent institution responsible for combating discrimination and protecting personal data. Overall, this draft does not align with the recommendations of international organizations, was not publicly developed, and its first public discussion occurred after it was registered in parliament.
The Commissioner’s mandate is not clearly defined at the constitutional and legislative levels, limiting its ability to operate effectively in line with international standards. Under the Ukrainian Constitution, its role is to oversee the observance of human rights by the executive authorities. However, in practice, its functions and powers are often defined as an executive authority with the right to develop and implement state policy, make mandatory decisions, and investigate and impose sanctions in cases specified by law. Such functions do not meet the international standards. Furthermore, the functions of the Commissioner do not align with those of other human rights institutions, such as the Military Ombudsman, the Commissioner for Gender Equality Policy, the Commissioner for Children’s Rights, and others. Conversely, international standards emphasize the need to establish an independent authority to regulate and safeguard personal data, as well as a separate body to investigate discrimination complaints. Therefore, the Commissioner’s powers should be reassessed in these areas.
The absence of a legally established, transparent, and open competitive procedure for selecting and appointing the Commissioner does not provide adequate guarantees of independence and professional competence.
Institutional independence is weakly protected, as the parliament can dismiss the Commissioner without explanation (e.g., the case involving the removal of Commissioner L. Denisova). The legislation also fails to adequately protect the Commissioner legally and physically, and there are no effective mechanisms in place to prevent interference with its activities.
There is no explicit legislative requirement for state authorities to collaborate with the Commissioner, especially when creating guidelines, shaping state policies, amending laws, or making other decisions related to human rights. The Commissioner’s authority in the legislative process is not clearly defined, particularly regarding the submission of proposals for Ukraine’s ratification and accession to international and regional human rights treaties, as well as the proposal of amendments to draft laws or participation in their discussions. This ambiguity restricts their role in implementing international standards.
There is an insufficient level of regulation regarding the personal data protection of data collected, processed, and disseminated by the Commissioner, particularly given the absence of specific rules and guidelines in this area.
The financial and resource support for the VRU Commissioner for Human Rights is insufficient and institutionally vulnerable, rendering it unable to carry out its constitutional duties in a stable, independent, and predictable manner. This is due to a lack of budgetary autonomy, inadequate protection from influence during the budget process, and insufficient resources to ensure infrastructure and staff security. Appointments to positions are often made without any competition, which may not ensure the selection of employees with proper knowledge of human rights.
The institution maintains financial secrecy regarding the activities of the Commissioner and its representative offices, as it does not disclose any information about the use of budget or donor funds.
Regional offices of the Commissioner face inadequate financial, human, and resource support, restricting their capacity to effectively monitor, conduct on-site meetings, and make operational decisions locally. Appointments to positions are often made without any competition.
Insufficient institutional development is evident through the absence of a completed strategic plan, weak internal organization, ineffective communication, and limited cooperation. Insufficient capacity development and staff motivation stem from limited professional training, a weak remuneration and support system, and incomplete safety and working conditions, all of which diminish the performance of functions.
The absence of established systems for managing complaints and requests, along with measures to prevent abuse.
The limited communication and information exchange with international NHRIs and civil society hinder the Commissioner’s ability to effectively promote human rights and coordinate efforts at both national and regional levels.
No strategy has been developed or implemented for activities in the occupied territories.

What Ukraine needs to do during its accession to the EU to improve the situation:

To reinforce the guarantees of the Ombudsman’s independence, it is necessary to amend the Law of Ukraine “On the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights” to explicitly enshrine:

The institutional, functional, and financial independence of the Commissioner in accordance with the Paris and Venice Principles.
A transparent, competitive, and inclusive process for appointing the Commissioner that involves civil society and clearly defines qualification criteria for candidates.
Sable, adequate, and secure funding for the Commissioner’s activities via a dedicated budget program. This includes involving the Commissioner in preparing the budget request, safeguarding expenses from sequestration, and requiring the publication of an open financial report detailing the Commissioner’s expenditures, including funds received for technical assistance.
A comprehensive list of grounds and a transparent process for early termination of powers, preventing political pressure or simplified dismissal methods.
Effective protections ensuring that the Commissioner and the Secretariat’s employees are shielded from interference by state authorities and political actors.
A ban on transferring the functions and powers of the Commissioner to private law entities, such as individuals and individual entrepreneurs, except for the operation of the National Preventive Mechanism.
To amend Article 22 of the Law on the Commissioner and eliminate the requirement for private law entities (individuals and legal entities under private law) to cooperate with the Commissioner.

The Commissioner’s mandate and access to resources are essential for its effective and independent work, and thus, it is necessary to:

Expand and explicitly define the mandate of the Commissioner for Human Rights, especially concerning monitoring and preventive oversight of state authorities’ activities, mandatory access to draft regulations and policies, involvement in their development, and offering recommendations to prevent human rights violations.
Ensure consistent human and financial support for the Commissioner’s activities, with staff recruited through open competitions, appropriate remuneration, ongoing professional training, and transparent reporting on the use of budgetary and international resources.
Enhance the powers to monitor and report on human rights compliance by ensuring free and prompt access to government premises, documents, and data. Introduce a mandatory response from state authorities to identified violations and establish effective oversight of the implementation of the Commissioner’s recommendations.
Clearly delineate the Commissioner’s powers from those of other state authorities to prevent overlap, especially in international activities, by discontinuing foreign representations not authorized by law and by fostering cooperation with the national human rights institutions of other countries.
Perform a financial review of the Commissioner’s activities and release its key findings.

Engagement with international organizations and civil society forms a vital part of the Commissioner’s institutional capacity, requiring to:

Establish systematic cooperation between the Commissioner and specialized international human rights mechanisms within the UN, the Council of Europe, and the EU. This includes preparing regular alternative reports and fostering the exchange of experiences and cooperation with national human rights institutions of other countries.
Strengthen and formalize the activities of consultative and advisory bodies under the Commissioner and its representatives, ensuring ongoing, representative participation by civil society organizations, human rights activists, experts, scientists, professional communities, and organizations working with vulnerable groups; and regularly publish draft and adopted documents produced by these mechanisms.
Strengthen the recognition of systemic human rights violations by engaging more deeply with non-governmental and human rights organizations, especially through joint events, expert panels, and various coordination activities.

Strengthening efforts to monitor human rights violations in occupied territories and address restrictions on human rights under martial law, especially by:

Developing methods for gathering information and individual complaints regarding human rights violations, using secure communication channels.
Publishing an annual report on human rights violations in the occupied territories and providing recommendations to authorities on enhancing the protection and exercise of human rights there, as well as the rights of IDPs.
Preparing a special report on restrictions on human rights during martial law, including recommendations on their proportionality and necessity, and proposals for their abolition after martial law.
Presenting the gathered information to international institutions and organizations.

For a more detailed overview of the EU and Ukraine’s acquis and case law concerning NHRIs, as well as justifications for our recommendations, please refer to the research on this page. Specifically, see the document available only in Ukrainian: National Human Rights Institution in the context of European Integration. If you have any feedback or comments about this material, please send them to: hrmap@ccl.org.ua.

Exsperts

Human Rights Association “FREERIGHTS”

Volodymyr Yavorskyy

lawyer, human rights defender, program director of the NGO “Center for Civil Liberties”