Prosecutor’s office
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Text as of March 2026
Reforming the prosecutor’s office is essential for Ukraine’s accession to the EU, as it must achieve full institutional independence and adhere to the rule of law. The European Commission’s 2023–2025 reports highlight the need to depoliticize the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General, ensure transparent staff policies, and enhance the autonomy of local governments. The reports also call for greater independence of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO/SAP) in investigating cases involving MPs, without requiring prior approval from the Prosecutor General. A key responsibility of the state is to ensure the functional independence of prosecutors and prevent any risk of improper interference in criminal proceedings.
Based on research and human rights practice, the following problems can be distinguished in Ukraine:
- The position of Prosecutor General remains politically dependent. If the Verkhovna Rada expresses no confidence in the Prosecutor General, the Prosecutor General is automatically dismissed. The President may initiate the dismissal of the Prosecutor General at their discretion, without providing a reason or consulting the self-governing bodies of the prosecutor’s office. The Venice Commission, the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), and the European Commission have identified this appointment and dismissal procedure as vulnerable to political interference. The centralized hierarchy of the prosecutor’s office prevents independent investigations involving a senior prosecutor.
- Self-governing bodies within the prosecutor’s office lack effective institutional capacity. The Prosecutors’ Council operates on a part-time, unpaid basis and remains financially and organizationally dependent on the Prosecutor General’s Office. The Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors (QDCPP) lacks independent resources and does not guarantee that prosecutors elected by their peers have a leading role. Both bodies lack adequate human, financial, and technological resources to meet their mandate. Employees of the QDCPP and the Council of Prosecutors should be protected from arbitrary dismissal.
- The process for appointing prosecutors to leadership roles does not consistently demonstrate transparency or adherence to merit-based criteria. Selection procedures for managerial-level prosecutors lack thorough assessments of integrity, professionalism, and leadership. The transparent selection practices introduced during the reform transition were discontinued after 2021. A unified system for regularly evaluating prosecutors using objective, pre-established criteria does not exist.
- There is currently no system for random case allocation, and decisions regarding changes in prosecutors cannot be appealed. The distribution of cases among prosecutors lacks clear, transparent rules, increasing the risk of undue influence in specific proceedings. Prosecutors cannot appeal decisions by higher prosecutors to remove them from cases.
- Disciplinary liability of prosecutors is ineffective. The grounds for disciplinary liability lack clarity, the range of disciplinary sanctions is limited, and the statute of limitations for initiating proceedings is inadequate. These shortcomings weaken the disciplinary system and erode trust in its processes. There are no institutional, hierarchical, or practical safeguards to ensure the independence of bodies overseeing or investigating the Prosecutor General at all stages of the proceedings. This creates a risk of impunity at the highest level.
- Law No. 4555-IX of July 22, 2025, undermined the independence of the prosecutor’s office. Even after some provisions were repealed, the law allowed the Prosecutor General to manage investigators directly, bypassing the case prosecutor and removing the procedural leader’s functional autonomy. The Law also allows prosecutors to be appointed without competition during martial law, restoring to the Prosecutor General and regional prosecutors the powers removed by the 2014 reform.
- The SAPO’s selection and disciplinary control model may lead to prosecutors becoming dependent on the head. The SAP Internal Control Unit reviews disciplinary complaints and conducts secret integrity checks, reporting directly to the SAP head. Prosecutors in this unit rely on decisions made by the same head whose disciplinary complaints they are tasked with reviewing.
- The current mechanism for protecting prosecutors who report internal violations is weak.
What Ukraine needs to do during its accession to the EU to improve the situation:
- Amend the Constitution to strengthen the independence of the prosecutor’s office. Remove the Verkhovna Rada’s authority to express no confidence in the Prosecutor General, which results in resignation. Also, remove the High Council of Justice’s authority to consider complaints regarding disciplinary decisions involving prosecutors.
- Establish a transparent and competitive process for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General. Ensure that the Council of Prosecutors, following a competitive process, issues non-binding recommendations on candidates for Prosecutor General before the President and Verkhovna Rada make their decision. Establish a process for consulting the Council of Prosecutors before any early dismissal of the Prosecutor General, and guarantee the Prosecutor General’s right to appeal such a dismissal in court. The legislation should specify a comprehensive list of clear, objective grounds for the early dismissal of the Prosecutor General. These grounds must not be overly broad or subject to excessive individual discretion.
- Establish an independent body to investigate crimes involving the Prosecutor General and deputies. Ensure the Prosecutor General has no influence over the appointment or career progression of investigators.
- Transform the Prosecutors’ Council into a full-fledged permanent body. Grant the Prosecutors’ Council status as a separate legal entity with independent financial, human, and technological resources. Ensure its powers are exercised on a permanent basis. Involve the Council in regular assessments of prosecutorial performance and enhance its authority to safeguard prosecutorial independence.
- Reform the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors (QDCPP). Ensure staff independence and autonomous resources. Amend the QSCPP composition to ensure that a majority of seats are held by prosecutors elected by their peers. Introduce an independent pre-selection process for Commission members, including integrity verification. Provide the Commission with autonomous institutional resources and an independent secretariat, organizationally separate from the Prosecutor General’s Office.
- Implement a unified evaluation system for prosecutors and ensure transparent selection processes for management positions. Establish a legislative framework for regular, objective evaluation of prosecutors with involvement from local government bodies. Implement transparent, competitive selection for management positions, including integrity and leadership assessments. Self-governing prosecutorial bodies should have a central role in this process.
- Implement a system for randomly assigning cases to prosecutors and establish a right to appeal decisions regarding changes in prosecutor assignment. Implement automated random case allocation using predefined criteria, such as specialization. Ensure prosecutors have a legal remedy to appeal removal decisions made by senior prosecutors. A case should be transferred to another prosecutor only in exceptional circumstances, based on a reasoned written decision subject to appeal.
- Revoke the amendments made by Law No. 4555-IX and revise the SAP model. Abolish provisions that allow the Prosecutor General to direct investigators without involving the assigned prosecutor and to appoint prosecutors without a competitive process. Revise the selection and disciplinary procedures for SAP prosecutors, ensuring their careers are managed by the general self-governing bodies of the prosecutor’s office, following reforms that guarantee the independence of these bodies. Internal control bodies within specialized prosecutors’ offices must remain organizationally independent from the head of the relevant office. The career progression of their employees should not significantly depend on decisions made by the individuals they oversee.
- Clarify the grounds for disciplinary liability and take steps to improve the effectiveness of disciplinary proceedings. Clearly define disciplinary offenses, expand the range of sanctions to ensure proportionality, extend the statute of limitations, and allow appeals of disciplinary decisions in court only after all internal procedures have been completed. An independent court, rather than a system in which the High Council of Justice exercises quasi-judicial functions, should conduct the final review of disciplinary decisions.
- Ensure effective protection for prosecutors who report violations, safeguarding them from retaliation and adverse career impacts, in accordance with CCPE Opinion No. 13 (2018) and EU Directive 2019/1937.
- Develop and implement a digital transformation strategy for the prosecutor’s office in alignment with EU standards.
For a comprehensive overview of these issues and the rationale behind our recommendations, please refer to the research section, specifically the document available in Ukrainian: Prosecutor’s Office. If you have any feedback or comments about this material, please send them to: hrmap@ccl.org.ua.
Published materials may be used provided that a mandatory link to the original source is included. @ 2026 Center for Civil Liberties.
Experts
Volodymyr Petrakovskyi
Senior lecturer of the Faculty of Law of the National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”