Non-enforcement of court decisions

Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law...

Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Text as of March 2026

Based on research and human rights practice, the following problems in the exercise of this right in Ukraine can be distinguished:

  1. The failure to enforce court decisions against the state is a widespread issue. Decisions of national courts in cases involving government bodies or state-owned companies often remain unenforced for years. The ECtHR has repeatedly found violations of the Convention in cases against Ukraine, including cases of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov, Burmych, Zhovner, Naydyon, Kaisin, and others. It declared that the state cannot justify the non-enforcement of court decisions on the grounds of lack of funds. There has been little progress in implementing the National Strategy to solve this problem until 2027.
  2. Moratoria and legislative bans prevent court decisions from being enforced. Current legislation includes moratoria that hinder the enforcement of decisions against state-owned enterprises and certain groups of debtors. Such legislative prohibitions on the adoption of enforcement measures have been determined to be inconsistent with Council of Europe standards and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Rule of Law Roadmap, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in 2025, envisages the creation of additional mechanisms for enforcing decisions against enterprises under moratoria.
  3. There are no efficient remedies against the non-enforcement of decisions. Individuals who have won court cases against the state often find it hard to access the resources they need to effectively enforce their rights. Judicial control over the enforcement of decisions is quite formal. The body responsible for enforcement independently reviews its actions and doesn’t need to report back to the court that issued the original order.
  4. Criminal liability for non-enforcement of court decisions is declarative, rather than effective. Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine envisions liability for non-enforcement of court decisions. However, in practice, there are very few convictions under this Article. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has repeatedly noted that existing sanctions do not have a deterrent effect. Once a notification of a criminal offense is sent, the enforcement proceeding ends. After this, the debtor cannot enforce the decision through the enforcement agent anymore.
  5. Social and other legislation impose state obligations without matching financial resource support. Numerous laws set social and other benefits, but their amounts do not match the actual state allocations budget. This results in the buildup of arrears under court decisions regarding the collection of social and other benefits. It is one of the main underlying causes of systemic non-enforcement.
  6. There is no unified system for properly accounting for and monitoring court decision enforcement. The court decision registers and the automated enforcement system are not yet integrated. This prevents an accurate calculation of the state’s total debt as per court decisions and hinders effective monitoring of their enforcement. Because of the lack of automated methods for collecting funds directly from debtors’ accounts, enforcement officers often have to follow lengthy manual procedures. This not only slows down the execution process but also creates conditions for abuse.
  7. The bankruptcy laws governing state-owned enterprises do not provide protection for creditors. The current bankruptcy regulations for enterprises with a state share have significant gaps. There is no effective mechanism for pre-trial rehabilitation. The conditions requiring the owner to decide to liquidate the enterprise have not been established. Creditors of such enterprises, especially regarding wage arrears, lack proper legal protection.
  8. Inequality between private and public enforcement agents. There is an imbalance and incoherence in the powers and actions. Private enforcement agents, unlike public ones, are not allowed to form working groups or assign tasks to colleagues for enforcement activities in other regions. Appealing the actions of a private enforcement agent is possible only through the court, while a public enforcement agent has a faster administrative mechanism. There is no system for exchanging information between public and private enforcement agents, leading to duplication of activities.
  9. The issue of enforcing binding (non-property) decisions, where the debtor must perform certain actions or refrain from doing so. Article 63 of the Law “On Enforcement Proceedings” introduces confusion, since not all binding decisions are non-pecuniary. There are insufficient mechanisms to enforce such decisions. Penalties for non-enforcement can be imposed only twice, after which enforcement proceedings end without results.
  10. Excessively lenient attitude towards debtors in the matter of revenue collection. In Ukraine, the general rule is that a debtor keeps 80% of their salary, while the creditor receives only 20%. There are some exceptions, such as when paying alimony or for damages caused by a crime. This approach should be revised to expedite the enforcement of court decisions while accounting for the debtor’s income level. In case of the debtor’s significant income, the payment share to the creditor should be higher.
  11. Martial law creates additional obstacles to the enforcement of decisions. Russia’s full-scale invasion and the imposition of martial law on February 24, 2022, have significantly complicated the enforcement of court decisions: proceedings in the temporarily occupied territories have been suspended, budgetary resources have been reduced, and a significant part of employees have been mobilized. The peculiarities of enforcement proceedings during martial law are regulated by Law No. 2147-IX, but temporary restrictions should not become permanent.

What Ukraine needs to do during its accession to the EU to improve the situation:

  • Revoke moratoria and legislative bans on the enforcement of court decisions. Abolish current moratoria on decisions concerning state-owned enterprises and those with more than 50% state ownership. Avoid introducing new moratoria or bans. Improve the bankruptcy procedures for state-owned enterprises in line with Council of Europe standards. Return to considering draft law No. 5660 “On Compulsory Enforcement of Decisions,” which was adopted as a basis in the first reading in 2021. Alternatively, develop a new law based on it that addresses new challenges. Complete the enforcement of the ECtHR decisions in the Ivanov and Burmych cases.
  • Introduce automatic enforcement of decisions made against the state, along with strong judicial oversight. Establish a mechanism for automatic enforcement of court decisions against state bodies. Ensure mandatory judicial oversight over the enforcement of all such decisions, including oversight of both the enforcement agent and the enforcement process as a whole. Enshrine in legislation the state’s liability for enforcing final decisions against enterprises it owns or controls. Allow limitations on this liability only if based on clear legislative criteria consistent with ECtHR case law. Legislatively limit the debtor’s ability to stop enforcement proceedings by filing unfounded complaints; establish procedural sanctions for abusing the right to appeal; introduce an expedited procedure for complaints about the enforcement agent’s actions, as the 10-day period is currently not observed.
  • Create efficient remedies against non-enforcement of decisions. Develop and adopt legislation that enables individuals to effectively enforce court decisions against the state. Establish a compensation mechanism for those whose decisions remain unenforced for extended periods. Ensure compensation is paid within six months of the decision becoming final. The introduction of a court penalty (astreinte) allows the court to impose a daily fine on the defendant for each day when the court decision is not enforced. This amount is paid to the collector and is considered more effective than the current system of fines. The draft of the new Civil Code (draft No. 14394) includes this mechanism.
  • Reform criminal liability for non-enforcement of court decisions. Amend Article 382 of the Criminal Code to establish effective rather than declarative accountability for officials of state bodies and enterprises who systematically evade compliance with court decisions. Distinguish liability for failing to comply with decisions about non-property and property actions.
  • Align legislation on the recognition and enforcement of foreign court decisions with EU standards, as set out in EU Regulation No. 1215/2012.
  • Reform social legislation to align with the state’s financial capacity and international human rights standards. Systematize all social and related payments. The state should guarantee social and economic rights that meet basic human needs. Other payments should depend on available financial resources. The state budget should clearly balance funding for each payment with the number of its recipients. New payments should not be introduced unless their funding sources are identified. Social aid should be targeted at people’s actual needs, not just formal criteria. Establish a mechanism to assess how new legislation affects the enforceability of decisions (regulatory impact assessment). Any draft law introducing new state obligations, such as social payments, benefits, or guarantees, should include an analysis of its potential to increase unenforceable decisions and provide supporting financial calculations.
  • Ensure the institutional independence of enforcement agents and consider expanding their powers. Reduce centralized control by the Ministry of Justice over private and public enforcement agents, ensure equal authority for private and public enforcement agents, authorize enforcement agents to collect funds from state debtors’ accounts, and expand their powers to enforce decisions involving state-owned enterprises. Private enforcement agents should be authorized to form working groups, give assignments to enforcement agents in other districts, and establish a unified information exchange system between private and public enforcement agents.
  • Digitize and automate enforcement proceedings. Integrate court decision registers with automated enforcement proceedings systems, implement automatic blocking and the collection of funds from debtors’ accounts, and streamline the issuance of enforcement documents through a one-step process. Establish a unified system for state debt accounting under court decisions and simplify enforcement agents’ access to information on debtors’ property and income. Draft law No. 14005, adopted in the first reading in November 2025, should be finalized and adopted.
  • Introduce mandatory public reporting on the status of enforcement of court decisions. Oblige the Ministry of Justice to publish annual statistics detailing the number of open and closed enforcement proceedings, the percentage of actual enforcement, average enforcement times, and the amount of state debt, broken down by state bodies, enterprises, and individuals.
  • Review the debtor’s protected income ratio. The law should establish a minimum income equal to the subsistence minimum retained by the debtor, with any excess applied to debt repayment, rather than the current “80% remaining for the debtor” approach.
  • Enhance enforcement mechanisms for court decisions requiring a debtor to act or abstain from specific actions.
  • Develop mediation and other alternative dispute resolution methods at the enforcement stage.
  • Develop a strategy for enforcing court decisions in the post-conflict period. In light of the International Claims Commission’s establishment under the Council of Europe and the extent of the destruction, develop a plan for the large-scale enforcement of post-de-occupation decisions. The plan should include mechanisms for property compensation in occupied territories and outline coordination with relevant international instruments.

For a more detailed overview of the EU and Ukraine’s acquis and case law related to NPM, along with justifications for our recommendations, please see the research section on this page.  Specifically, see the document available only in Ukrainian: Non-Enforcement of Court Decisions. If you have any feedback or comments about this material, please send them to: hrmap@ccl.org.ua.

Published materials may be used provided that a mandatory link to the original source is included. @ 2025 Center for Civil Liberties.

Experts

Picture of Yana Bilas

Yana Bilas

lawyer, specialist in the field of international human rights protection, researcher